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Public
Town Hall Meeting to Discuss President Bush's National Strategy
to Secure Cyberspace
7 - 9 p.m.
, Jan. 28, 2003
The Neurosciences Institute, 10640 John Jay Hopkins Drive,
San Diego, CA Full
story
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CAIDA's Walrus Shows Universe of Data
May
29, 2002 – Unreleased visualization tool already making
a splash. As the Internet has grown over the years, it has
become more and more complex. When that complexity is visualized
with Walrus, a new tool being developed by the Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) at SDSC, the
results can be spectacular.
CAIDA
promotes the engineering and maintenance of a robust and scalable
Internet infrastructure by providing tools and analyses to
the planners and service providers who keep the net going.
Most of these tools and analyses are used only by specialists,
but occasionally an analysis turns out to be so interesting
that outsiders take notice.
Walrus
recently captured the attention of the magazine Yahoo! Internet
Life. In the May 2002 issue, the "Click" feature
of people, places, and trends on the Net, led with a complex
Walrus-generated visualization of round-trip times of data
packets issued from a measurement point in Herndon, Virginia,
to nodes on the Internet around the world and back again.
The image is the work of Walrus's creator, Young Hyun, working
from a data analysis by CAIDA's Bradley Huffaker. Full
Story
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SDSC Computer Crime Specialist Erin Kenneally "Testifies"
at Annual Forensic Conference
March
21, 2001 – SDSC forensic analyst and
compter security specialist Erin Kenneally was one of three
leaders of a seminar on "What You Always Wanted to Know
about Digital Evidence but Were Afraid to Ask" at the
53rd annual scientific meeting of the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences (AAFS), held in Seattle on February 23,
2001.
Chaired
by Carrie M. Whitcomb, Director of the National Center for
Forensic Science at the University of Central Florida in Orlando,
the seminar gave an overview of the legal hazards involved
in collection, storage, and transmittal of digital evidence.
"Computer
forensics is still a pretty new field," Kenneally said,
"and it's important to educate the community about some
of the unique aspects and issues. Forensics professionals
in other disciplines are coming to understand this field's
uniqueness and realize that the subject deserves the same
respect as more traditional areas of criminology and legal
investigation."
Approximately
100 forensics professionals attended the seminar, which examined
how the revolution in personal electronics has changed the
practice of gathering evidence. "Investigators are used
to handling traditional forms of evidence," Kenneally
said. "Fingerprints or handwritten notes at a crime scene,
or the diary or answering machine of a suspect or victim .
. . these could all be bagged, tagged, and entered into the
evidence log. But what does an investigator do when the evidence
might be in a computer file, e-mail, a Palm Pilot, a digital
answering machine, or a pager? How does an investigator make
sure the evidence stays intact and unimpeachable? If encrypted
files are involved, how do you even find the evidence in the
first place?"
Full story
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UCSD Researchers Analyze Prevalence and Patterns of Worldwide
Denial-of-Service Attacks on the Internet
May
30, 2001 –- Using a new technique, UCSD network researchers
from the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC) and the Jacobs
School of Engineering have analyzed the worldwide pattern
of malicious denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the computers
of corporations, universities, and private individuals. The
attacks disable Web servers on the Internet by overloading
them with messages, which usually contain false source addresses
to conceal the locations of the attackers. But in a clever
twist, the researchers used key features of these messages'
forged signatures to detect and track the attacks.
"We
believe that our research provides the only publicly available
data quantifying denial-of-service activity in the Internet,"
said David Moore, a senior researcher in UCSD's Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) program at
SDSC. Moore and UCSD Computer Science and Engineering professors
Geoff Voelker and Stefan Savage have devised a new technique
called "backscatter analysis" that gives an estimate
of worldwide denial-of-service activity. Their research enables
network engineers to understand the nature of recent attacks
and to study long-term trends and recurring patterns of attacks.
Full
story
CAIDA Network Researchers Track the Worldwide Spread of the
"Code Red" Worm
July
25, 2001 –-
Someone
turned a worm loose on the Internet late last week, and in
less than a day it infected hundreds of thousands of Web servers
around the world. Using sophisticated new "backscatter
analysis" techniques developed to detect denial-of-service
attacks, researchers at the Cooperative Association for Internet
Data Analysis (CAIDA) of the San Diego Supercomputer Center
(SDSC) tracked the progress of the infestation.
"More
than 359,000 computers were infected with a version of the
Code Red worm in less than 14 hours," said David Moore,
SDSC senior network researcher and a principal investigator
at CAIDA. "At the peak of the infection frenzy, more
than 2,000 new hosts were infected each minute."
The
Code Red worm infects Web servers by exploiting a security
flaw in the Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS)
software package; only systems that run Microsoft software
are infected. On July 12, less than a month after the IIS
vulnerability was made known to the computer security community,
the Code Red worm was detected "in the wild" by
Marc Maiffret and Ryan Permeh of eEye Digital Security. A
new, "improved" variant surfaced on July 19.
Once
it infects a host, the Code Red worm tries to spread the infection
by sending a copy of itself to 99 random IP addresses. Then
it waits. On the 20th day of the month, each copy of the worm
tries to bombard the White House Web site with messages in
an attempt to overload its Web server. Fortunately, the White
House webmaster was alerted to the problem and changed the
numeric IP address of the Web server, which foiled the second
phase of the attack. Full
story
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